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Abstract
We compare the two approaches to the empirical logic of automata.
The first, called partition logic (logic of microstatements), refers to ex-
periments on individual automata. The second one, the logic of simu-
lation (logic of macrostatements), deals with ensembles of automata.
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Introduction
The principal goal of this paper is to bring the two approaches to the empir-
ical logic of automata in a coherent perspective. Two groups of researchers
(M. Schaller and K. Svozil in Vienna, and A. A. Grib and R. R. Zapatrin in
St. Petersburg) have approached this issue from different directions. In this
joint paper we investigate the connection between these two approaches.
The paper is organized in the following way: in section 1 the class of
automata we are going to deal with is specified. In section 2 the concept of
the empirical logic of automata is specified. The approach carried out by the
Vienna group based on a partitioning of the set of automaton states is intro-
duced in section 3, and that of the St. Petersburg group based on a closure
operation on the set of inputs is described in section 4. The comparison of
the two approaches concludes the paper.
1 Automaton model
In this paper we shall deal with the specific class of automata, called nor-
malized introduced in [4]. The main feature of these automata is that they
may be completely defined by a non-oriented graph P = (V,E), V being
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the set of vertices and E the set of edges. The states of the automaton
correspond to the vertices of the graph P . We also assume the existence
of a so-called final state 0. The inputs of the automaton are in one–to–one
correspondence with its states. One could think of applying an input v as
checking the appropriate state. Now assume that the automaton is initially
in state u ( 6= 0) and input v is applied. Then the transition δ : u → v
takes place if and only if the vertices u, v are linked by an edge of the graph
P , otherwise the automaton goes into the final state 0; i.e.,
δ(u, v) :=


v , if (u, v) ∈ E
0 otherwise
The two-valued output function depends on the resulting state. Its value
is 0 if the resulting state is the final state, and 1 if the resulting state is any
other; i.e.,
λ(δ(u, v)) :=


1 , if δ(u, v) 6= 0
0 , if δ(u, v) = 0
As an example, consider the normalized automaton associated with the
graph P drawn in Fig. 1. Suppose the automaton is prepared in the initial
state corresponding to the vertex 1. Then, if we apply the input 1, the
state of the automaton will not change, and it will output the symbol 1. If,
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starting from the same initial state 1, the input 2 is applied, the state of the
automaton changes to 2, though the output value will still be 1. If, on the
other hand, we apply any one of the inputs 3 or 4, then the automaton makes
a transition to the final state 0 (since there is no edge between the initial
vertex 1 and the vertices 3 and 4, respectively) and the output value will
be 0. We shall return to this example in the discussion of the propositional
structures below.
2 Empirical logic of automata
The motivation behind the investigations in this paper is the construction
of primitive empirical statements or propositions about automata [3]. Such
experimental statements form the basis of the formal investigation of the cor-
✉ ✉
✉✉1 2
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Figure 1: The graph P (V,E). The set of vertices V = {1, 2, 3, 4}, the set of
edges E = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)}.
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responding logics. In particular, there exist automata for which validation of
one empirical statement makes impossible the validation of another empirical
statement and vice versa, as it was first pointed out by Moore [6].
Thereby, one decisive feature of the set-up is the intrinsic character of the
measurement process: The automaton is treated as a black box with known
description but unknown initial state. Automata experiments are conducted
by applying an input sequence and observing the output sequence.
In the above example, it is not necessary to input sequences containing
more than one symbol, since the non-final states are not distinguished by the
output function.
3 Microstatements: partition logic
The conventional state identification problem [6, 2, 1] is to obtain information
about an unknown initial state. Thereby it is assumed that only a single
automaton copy is available for inspection. That is, no second, identical
example of the automaton can be used for further examination. Alternatively,
one may think of it as choosing at random a single automaton from an
automata ensemble which differ only by their initial state. The task then is
5
to find out which was the initial state of the chosen automaton.
The partition logic approach to finite automata study was introduced in
[10], and subsequently in [7, 8, 9]. There, statements about single automata
of the following form pA are considered:
pA := ”the state v of the automaton is in A”, (1)
where A is a subset of the set of automaton states. For any statement pA we
can build its opposite pA, namely,
pA := ”the state v of the automaton is NOT in A”
Let us try to characterize this state identification problem algebraically.
Again, V denotes the set of automaton states. Now associate with any input
v the set of automaton states such that any pair of states from any element
of the partition are mutually indistinguishable. For normalized automata
studied in this paper, this partition reduces to the splitting of the entire set
of states V into two subsets
V = V0 ∪ V1 (2)
V0 = {w ∈ V | (v, w) 6∈ E} (3)
V1 = {w ∈ V | (v, w) ∈ E} (4)
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where E stands for the set of edges of the graph P (V,E). Then, a property
pA of the form (1) is said to be testable if and only if the set A is contained
in the partition (2) associated with some input.
Now consider the entire collection of the sets of the form V0 and V1 (2) for
all possible inputs v. Note that for different inputs, the partitions (2) may
coincide (cf. the example below). V0 may be thought of as the negation of
V1 and vice versa. Therefore, each pair of them form a Boolean algebra 2
2.
The propositional structure is then built from these algebras by pasting; i.e.,
by identifying their greatest and their least elements. The resulting propo-
sitional structures are the lattices MOn, where n stands for the number of
different partitions (2). The partial order can be interpreted as logical impli-
cation “⇒” on the statements about a single automaton from the ensemble.
This is why we call these statements microstatements.
To take up the example mentioned earlier, consider the partitions pro-
duced by all possible inputs v = 1, 2, 3, 4. They are
v = 1 : V = {1, 2} ∪ {3, 4} (5)
v = 2 : V = {1, 2, 3} ∪ {4} (6)
v = 3 : V = {1} ∪ {2, 3, 4} (7)
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Figure 2: Lattice MO3 of the intrinsic propositional calculus.
v = 4 : V = {1, 2} ∪ {3, 4} (8)
Note that the inputs 1 and 4 produce the same partitions. The resulting
propositional structure is drawn in Fig. 2. It should be emphasized that
although the elements of the lattice associated with the partition logic are
the subsets of the set of states V , the partial order relation (“implication
⇒”) is weaker than the set theoretical inclusion “⊂.” For instance, we can
see from the above example that {1} ⊂ {1, 2, 3} but {1} 6⇒ {1, 2, 3}. In
general, the partial order relation always implies set inclusion but not vice
versa. Only if two statements can be identified by the same experiment, i.e.,
only if both statements are simultaneously measurable, the partial ordering
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coincides with set inclusion.
4 Macrostatements: logic of simulation
Another approach to the logic of finite automata was introduced in [4, 5].
Unlike that giving rise to the partition logic described in the previous section,
it assumes dealing with ensembles of automata rather than with a single pat-
tern and therefore the notion of property is referred to the ensemble. This
was the reason to call the statement arising in this approach macrostate-
ments.
Before describing the approach in general, we return to our example of
automaton. Suppose now that we have at our disposal two ensembles of
such automata. The first of them is prepared in such a way that some of
the constituent automata of the ensemble are in the state {1, 2, 3}. That is,
initially, the automata from the first ensemble are either in state 1 or in state
2 or in state 3. The second ensemble is prepared in the state {2, 3, 4}. That
is, initially, the automata from the first ensemble are either in state 2 or in
state 3 or in state 4.
As before, only one experiment on each particular automaton from the
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ensemble can be carried out; from each individual automaton in the ensemble,
only a single copy is available.
We first perform experiments on the first ensemble. Suppose we have
generated the protocol of a sufficiently large sequence of measurements of
the results of each input. The values of the output function which can be
observed are 0 and 1 for each input.
Next, we deal with the second ensemble in a similar way. Again, looking
into the protocol, we see that there are 0’s and 1’s as the result of each input.
Since we have made no particular choice of the distribution of the initial
states, we have to conclude that the two states of the ensemble described
above are indistinguishable.
However, assume that a third ensemble is prepared in the ”pure” state
associated with the activation of only the vertex 1. Then, analyzing the
protocol, one finds that the output values corresponding to the input 3 are
always 0. This makes the protocol differ from the protocols generated from
the first two ensembles. Thus, we can distinguish the state of the third
ensemble from the states of the first and the second ensemble.
We now give the rigorous definitions. With each subset A ⊆ V , we
consider the statement about the ensemble of automata of the following form
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sA:
sA := ”the state v of each particular automaton is in A” (9)
For any statement sA we can build its opposite sA, namely,
sA := ”the state v of each particular automaton is NOT in A”
Then, a property sB of the form (9) is said to be testable if and only if
there exist a subset A ⊆ V such that
sB = sA
The motivation for this definition is the following. The outcome of the
statistical experiment on the ensemble of automata is the protocol of the
following form:
input 1 0001110101 . . .
input 2 1001010111 . . .
. . . . . .
...
...
an input the values of the output function
The rows of the protocol containing the output values equal to 1 bring no
essential information. Only the rows in which the values of the output func-
tion is always 0 contain information relevant to our purposes. That is the
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reason why the subsets having only 0’s in the appropriate line of the protocol
are treated as testable within this approach.
In our example, the only proper (i.e. 6= 0, V ) subsets which are in principle
testable, are: {1}, {4}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}. For instance, if, on any input of 1, the
output is always 0, then one can conclude that the automata in the ensemble
are either in the (micro-)state 3 or in (micro-)state 4; therefore the ensemble
is in the macrostate denoted by {3, 4}. Since the partial order relation strictly
follows set inclusion, the lattice of properties looks as the one drawn in Fig.
3.
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Figure 3: The diagram of testable properties.
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5 Concluding remarks
Let us finally state the common features of our two approaches.
Operationalistic. Just as in quantum measurements, the extrinsic view is
assumed to be inaccessible. All we are allowed to do is to choose the input
to be applied and then observe the output values. For instance, in order to
measure the electron spin, we are not allowed to “screw open” the electron.
Moreover, one cannot in general copy an (arbitrary number of) identical
electrons from the single electrons taken from an ensemble.
Mathematical. In both approaches, the collection of propositions is asso-
ciated with a partially ordered set, whose elements are subsets of the set of
states of the automaton.
Since our two approaches are based on different empirical setups, there
are certain features in which of our two approaches differ.
Automaton model. The normalized automata used here are appropriate
for the logical simulation of macrostatements. They are assumed to have only
two output values. With a different automaton model, to which the partition
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logic of microstatements is applicable, one obtains more general structures
of microstatements than the lattices MOn. Examples of such automaton
models are Moore and Mealy type automata having more than two output
values and thus allowing for more than two elements in the partitions.
Operationalistic.
• To formulate the microstatements (to which partition logic is applica-
ble), the experiment is assumed to be carried out with a single automa-
ton.
• Macrostatements refer to ensembles of automata.
Mathematical.
• In partition logic, the structure of the collection of properties is always
a pasting of Boolean algebras. It may not even be a lattice [10, pp.
137-141].
• The structure of the collection of macroproperties is always a lattice
with orthocomplementation. It is not necessarily orthomodular [11].
• The collections of subsets associated with testable microstatements and
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macrostatments do not in general include one another but always over-
lap. The partial ordering of these subsets can be induced from both
sorts of propositional structures. For macrostatements, the partial or-
der is exactly the set inclusion. As has already been pointed out, for
microstatements the set inclusion implies the partial order only if both
statements are simultaneously measurable (cf. section 3).
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